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COMMENTS on Force and Weapons Directives, January 2021To Chief Lovell, Capt. Parman, Lieutenant Morgan, PPB Policy Analysts, Compliance Officer/Community Liaison Team, Portland Committee on Community Engaged Policing, US Dept. of Justice, Citizen Review Committee and the Portland Police Bureau:
Below are our comments on the Directives posted for review in mid January which focus on force
and weapons
We continue to be concerned that Directive 1010.00 on Use of Force defines de-escalation both as
lowering tension at a scene and using less force on a suspect. We repeat again our opposition to
changes made in 2017 to these policies: they delay the requirement for officers involved in the death
of a civilian to write force reports until after a criminal investigation has ended, and if their gunfire
did not result in death, they leave such reporting up to the discretion of supervisors.
An overall note we've sent before which requires serious attention: The Bureau should stop using
the word "tool" to refer to weapons, as is done repeatedly in Directive 1010.00, and in Directive
1020.00 (Section 5.4.3). These items are all designed to kill, harm, wound, or physically coerce
people to follow police orders, not items used to open paint cans or build shelters for houseless
people.
We still urge the Bureau to give different labels to all of the major sections of the Directives, such
as the Definitions, Policy and Procedure sections (our comments here refer to the Procedure section
unless otherwise noted) so there are not multiple sections numbered "1."
DIRECTIVE 1010.00-USE OF FORCE
Minimizing Force vs. Not Resorting to Force: In our 2018 comments on this Directive, we
noted that the phrase asking officers to "develop... the skills... to regularly resolve confrontations
while minimizing the need to use force" (Policy Section 4), does not match the requirements of the
Settlement Agreement, which calls for language saying "without resorting to force or [using] the
least amount of force" (paragraphs 66 a&b). At the very least, we suggested, the phrase should say
"minimizing the use of force" without the unnecessarily loaded word "need." We are not sure how
the current version passed muster with the DOJ.
De-Escalation Definitions: While the Bureau put more emphasis on de-escalation a few
years ago when De-escalation became Section 1 of this Directive, we remain very concerned that the
Bureau keeps using the term "de-escalation" to mean two different things. The only way it should
be used is to indicate verbal and physical means to lower the likelihood that a confrontation will end
with violence (Sections 1.1 and 1.4). Another term should be used to describe officers using less
force on a person who's already been subjected to use of force as their resistance lowers (Section
1.5), which is a good policy but should not be called "de-escalation." The Settlement Agreement
also uses the term in this second way, but we still recommend another word ("abatement" or
"mitigation" of force) so that officers do not continue to describe moving from using a Taser to
using pepper spray, for instance, as "de-escalation." Section 1.1.1(3) still implies that making
threats ("warnings") is a form of de-escalation, which it is not.
--We appreciate that the Bureau fixed the problems we previously identified in the syntax of the
Definition of "de-escalation," however, that Definition still reflects this dual use.
Clarity on Disengagement: Section 1.3 helps clarify the difference between disengagement
and de-escalation, but it requires that the benefits of disengagement "clearly" outweigh the risks,
which seems subjective. We suggested something more like how suspicion of criminal activity is
noted: "it is more likely than not that disengagement provides more benefits than risks."
Clarify "Boxing In": In Section 7.1, it implies that "boxing in" requires the officers' cars to
make contact with the suspect's vehicle. This would seem to be restrictive on officers finding a
nonviolent way to keep a driver from fleeing without making contact.
Use Civilians to Investigate: Section 12.3.1 requires a Supervisor who uses force to call in
another Supervisor to conduct an investigation. Portland Copwatch still believes the Directive
should at least require that other Supervisor to be of a higher rank-- or more importantly, as we have
suggested repeatedly, the investigation should be done by a civilian oversight agency.
In our comments on this Directive in 2014, 2015, and 2017 and 2018 we asked the Bureau to make
these changes, suggestions which have still gone nowhere:
Defining Force: The Bureau should re-insert the words "physical or mechanical
intervention" to the Definition of Use of Force which were in the 2014 version of the Directive,
regarding force used against physical resistance during "control holds and un-resisted
handcuffing." The current version says "control holds and handcuffing without resistance do not
constitute force." We still believe the Directive should be clear that just as any unwanted touching
of an officer by a community member is considered assault on an officer, any unsolicited touching
of a civilian by a police officer is a use of force.
It's A Decision, Not Fate: Replace the phrase "[the Bureau's commitment to public safety]
may require" the use of force (Policy Section 2) with something which emphasizes force is always
a choice.
All Force Issues in One Place: The Bureau should reinstate the Sections on analysis of
force confrontations to this Directive, rather than leaving them removed to Directive 315.30
Satisfactory Performance. There is currently no substantive reference to 315.30 in the Force policy.
Institute Limits on Discretion: Leeway is given to officers to precipitate force using actions
which are not Bureau-approved by saying officers can do so with "substantial justification." That
exception still in the Directive in three places: Sections 5.3.2 (Member considerations), 6.4.3.2.1
(using pepper spray on a car's driver), and 8.5.9 (entering a car readily able to be driven). The
Directive should list specific reasons which could justify such deviations.
Describe Which Force is More Serious: The current Directive still is clear enough about
what is meant by "avoid[ing] a use of a higher level of force" (Impact Munitions 6.4.2.1.3, Tasers
6.4.4.1.3 and 6.4.4.2.1), because there is no clear continuum explaining which options are
considered lower. The Directive says that Impact Weapons/ Munitions and Tasers can be used
against "active aggression" (6.4.1.1.1, 6.4.2.1.1, 6.4.4.1.1) while pepper spray can be used against
physical resistance "or the intent to engage in physical resistance" (6.4.3.1.1). It seems that pepper
spray is a lower use of force and thus should appear before the other "less lethals." Deadly force is
authorized "to protect (officers) from what they reasonably believe to be an immediate threat of
death or serious physical injury" or to stop a fleeing felon who poses such a threat (8.1). Between
"less lethal" and Deadly Force are the Police Vehicle Intervention Strategies (Section 7). Some of
the "higher level of force" can be gleaned from examining how certain force is investigated
(Categories I-IV), though pointing a gun at someone (Category IV) is, in our minds, just as serious
as using pepper spray on them (Category III), since an accidental firearm discharge or the chemical
weapon could kill the person.
Are Warnings Heard?: The call for officers to issue warnings before using force (Section
3) does not include concepts to ensure people understand the warnings. Both we and the Training
Advisory Council suggested the Bureau address barriers such as mental health crisis and intoxicant
impairment, as listed in Section 1.2 as reasons for lack of compliance, and we suggest cultural
norms and deafness also be added in both places. Section 3.1.1.1 removes Vehicle Intervention and
Category IV force from the requirement for warnings, but we believe some of those techniques,
including the Category IV pointing of a firearm, should require warnings.
Apply More Graham Standard Tests: The current Directive doesn't mention the suspect's
impact on the public as a consideration under the Graham standard of "reasonableness," only
Severity of the crime (5.1.2), Resistance/evading (5.1.3) and Threat (5.1.1). Time and available
resources, which are crucial to de-escalation, are not mentioned. Instead the Directive says "a
reasonableness inquiry is not limited to these [three] factors" (5.2).
Remembering the Bureau's Past, Reflecting on "I Can't Breathe": After Officer Larry
Wingfield used a carotid choke hold in August 2018, we asked the Bureau to address our concern
that the hold is mentioned in the definition of deadly force and "serious use of force," as well as
Section 10.2.1.4 with no restriction. The Bureau banned the use of that hold after the death of
Lloyd "Tony" Stevenson in 1985.
Limiting Use of "Hard Objects": We still appreciate that the Definition of deadly force
includes a "strike to the head, neck or throat with a hard object" (and that is investigated as deadly
force in 10.2.1.5), but remain concerned there is an implied permission to use such tactics because
there are no prohibitions in the policy. It must be noted here that the Compliance Officer called out
the Bureau (and IPR) for not investigating an officer at a protest who deliberately hit someone in
the head with a baton (as is clear in the video of the incident) as deadly force. As previously noted
by PCW, Section 6.4.1.2.1 restricts the use of batons/impact weapons on the "head or throat, neck,
spine or groin unless deadly force would be authorized."
--We are concerned that the current Directive also still seems to authorize use of anything other
than Batons as an impact weapon if an officer "reasonably believes that other authorized physical
force responses are not available" (Section 6.4.1.1.1.1).
Help Portland Be a Humane Society: Section 6.4.2.1.6 allows Impact Munitions to be used
on "vicious or aggressive animals" if they interfere with safety or "the completion of a police
mission." While such munitions are designed to be "less lethal" on humans, they are more likely to
cause deadly injuries to smaller animals, so the threshold should be higher than "this animal is
bugging me while I'm trying to do my job."
Key Provision for Recent Shooting: The Section restricting firing at moving vehicles
(8.5.2) says deadly force is authorized if there is an "immediate risk of death or serious physical
injury." The Bureau has not reinstituted the old provision that such a threat has to come from
something other than the vehicle. Regardless, the officer who shot at a car after it rammed
into both her and her patrol car in December 2020 may have been in violation of this Section, since,
according to media reports, the immediate risk was over at the time she fired.
___Weapons Use in the Force Directive
Less Lethal is Not "Non Lethal": The Directive includes policies on Less Lethal Weapons,
Batons, Conducted Energy Weapons (Tasers), Aerosol Restraints (Pepper Spray), Impact
Munitions, Riot Control Agents, and Hobbles under the general category of Less Lethal Weapons
(Section 6). The Directive cautions that such weapons "can still result in death or serious injury"
(Section 6.1). However, we again urge the Bureau to carry forward the warning from the definition
of "Impact Munition" in Directives 1020 & 1021 which says such weapons are "not to be
considered non-lethal."
Clearly Define Subject Resistance: Section 6.1 suggests "less lethals" can be used on
"threatening or actively resistive" subjects. The term "actively resistive" should be more narrowly
defined because (a) sometimes people's natural reactions to being touched, grabbed or roughed up
is not "active resistance," and (b) in order to justify the use of force to witnesses, officers often yell
out "stop resisting" when someone is not doing anything.
Crowd Munitions: After the long summer of protests against police violence (which were
met with police violence), it seems the Bureau should both hold officers to existing policies and be
more restrictive and specific. Section 6.4.2 says a 40 MM launcher should not be aimed at a
person's head or chest or other vulnerable areas or at close range, actions that we know happened in
August 2018 and probably many times in 2020. There should also be more specific restrictions on
the various munitions that can be fired from the launchers including "Aerial Distraction Devices,"
pepper balls, foam batons and whatever other monstrosities the industry is making available these
days. There should also be serious consequences for their misuse.
Tasers and the Law: Our greatest concern about the Taser provisions is they still do not
seem to be in line with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, whose ruling said Tasers are a serious
enough use of force that they can only be used when there is an "active threat." (The ACLU also
referenced the Bryan v. MacPherson case in their comments.) While the Directive prohibits Taser
use against a person who is merely running away, it allows use with a "reasonable belief that the
subject presents a risk of death or serious injury" (Section 6.4.4.1.4).
Taser Threats: We remain concerned that officers are allowed to use "arcing" (creating an
electrical "zap" with the Taser) in the air as a means of warning a suspect of impending use of force
(6.4.4.1.5), especially since warning shots from a firearm are prohibited (Section 8.3.1). The
Directive also still allows a Taser to be used to threaten or coerce a person to "manage a potential or
actual physical confrontation" (6.4.4.2.2), which is not a form of de-escalation. Section 6.4.4.1.5
also allows using the Taser's laser sight light as a means of warning, which is similarly
unreasonable. We continue to remind the Bureau that "Laser Light Only" was tracked until 2008
and the Auditor and the Community/Police Relations Committee both suggested that practice
should be reinstated.
Loopholes for Weapons Use: Previously, it was prohibited to use Tasers against persons
engaged in passive resistance. Section 4.1 prohibits force to overcome such resistance, but only if
the resistance "does not impede a lawful objective." We continue to think this is a license for
officers to use violence against non-violent protestors (or criminal suspects). Section 6.4.6.2.1
specifically says riot control agents and "area impact weapons" can't be used in cases of passive
resistance that, again, "does not impede a lawful objective." These loopholes need to be more
narrowly defined or removed.
--Also, the list of persons against whom less-lethal weapons should not be used (Section 6.2) still
leaves off the old prohibition on using them on people over the age of 60. Section 10.3.1.12
requires any use against people in restricted categories (people under 15, medically fragile or
pregnant) to be investigated as a Category II (high level) Use of Force, regardless of which weapon
is used.
--We stand by this comment: "While it is commendable (and in line with the Settlement Agreement)
that officers should not use Tasers against persons who seem to be in mental health crisis (Section
6.4.4.2.1), there is still no consideration for people who may have epilepsy or other conditions
making them vulnerable to Taser use."
Bogus Science: As noted repeatedly in the past, we do not find the argument persuasive that
the DOJ told the Bureau the use of the phrase "excited delirium" (Section 9.8, requiring EMS to be
called), is a "term of art" so can remain in the policy. "Excited delirium" is not defined in the
Directive, is not a medically accepted term, and was objected to by others in the community other
than Portland Copwatch. Taser International (now Axon) uses this term to explain why hundreds of
people have died since 2002 after being struck by their allegedly safe electroshock weapons.
Explicit Reporting Requirements Needed: Over five years after being cut, the Bureau has
not reinserted sections detailing what should go into a force report, requiring a supervisor to check
on a wounded civilian who is hospitalized, photographing injuries, and explaining why a Taser was
used. Talking to the person who is subjected to force is not a mandatory part of the Supervisor's
on-scene force investigation (Section 12), except that they be given medical attention (12.2). Section
13.4.6 says Supervisors should "attempt" to interview the subject, but there is no caution against
asking questions about potential underlying criminal activity. PCW continues to call for the
"Independent" Police Review (IPR) or other such non-police agency to respond to scenes of use of
force to avoid such legal complications.
Pepper Spray is Dangerous: We repeat that Pepper Spray has been known to cause or
contribute to the deaths of numerous people (including Dickie Dow in Portland in 1998), so we are
glad it is considered on the same level as Tasers (1-2 cycles) and impact weapons (Section
10.4.1.2), even though the threshold for use (physical resistance) is lower. It's not clear why
reporting on the circumstances leading to the discharge of Less Lethal Weapons/Munitions
(11.2.1.1) and Tasers (11.2.3.1.1) are required, but there are no specific reporting requirements for
Pepper Spray.
Chemical Weapons: We continue to have concerns that Incident Commanders in crowd
situations can authorize the use of chemical agents to disperse a crowd (6.4.6.1.1) since persons not
engaged in "physical resistance" or "active aggression" are being subjected to such gassing
(something which occurred many times in 2020). The admonition "to minimize exposure to non-
targeted persons" (Section 6.4.3.2.2) is meaningless when officers use pepper spray or other
chemicals so indiscriminately. Also, a previous restriction to only use the spray from four feet away
or more has still not been reinserted.
____Reporting Requirements in Force Directive
More Reporting Needed: We are still concerned that this Directive (and 905.00) only asks
for limited after action reporting on "crowd events," which used to be mandatory. Now reporting
only has to happen after "launched impact munitions with contact" (10.3.1.6), use of "riot control
agents and/or area impact munitions"(10.3.1.11), "impact weapon with injury requiring hospital
treatment" (10.3.1.7), and various uses of force which are sometimes used but not necessarily
particular to crowd control. Reports that only go up to the Responsibility Unit Manager (Lieutenant,
Captain or Commander), not the Chief's office, are to be written for "use of aerosol restraints"
(10.4.1.2), "use of impact weapon, without injury" (10.4.1.4), "launched impact munitions, without
injury" (10.4.1.7) and other various uses of force.
--We appreciate that the requirement that Taser deployment has to be follow up with an After
Action report regardless of "successful application or [officer] intent" was moved up to be Section
10.4.1.2 as we suggested.
Any Misconduct Should Be Investigated: In 2018 we suggested that the word "significant"
be removed from Section 13.4.10.2.10 requiring Supervisors to report information to the
Professional Standards Division (PSD) if there is evidence of "significant" misconduct, as any
misconduct during a force incident should be investigated. That has still not been fixed.
Off Duty Cops: We're not sure when this was added but we appreciate that Section
11.1.4.1 requires officers to report force used in their capacity as law enforcement while off duty.
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DIRECTIVE 1010.10 POST DEADLY FORCE PROCEDURES
Once again, most of these comments are repeats. This is the Directive which City Council ordered
the Bureau to adopt in August 2017. We hope that the Bureau will feel confident to make policy
changes that do not disturb the intent of Council-- which was mostly focused on ensuring officers
in deadly force incidents are interviewed within 48 hours without interfering with the criminal
investigation.
Deadly Force Without Death/Reporting Requirements: The Directive notes that the District
Attorney is in charge of investigating all deaths in the County (Section 1, ORS 164.095) but implies
all officer involved shootings will be handled in the same way. A previous draft separated out cases
in which the suspect was not killed, which would have required more reporting to be done by
involved officers. The involved officer is not required to fill out a Force Report at all, while (a)
Homicide Detectives fill out a "General Offense Report" (2.2.4.1.1), (b) the Professional Standards
Division (PSD)'s written report substitutes for the officer's Force Report (3.2), and (c) no After
Action Report is required because PSD's review supposedly serves the same function (3.3). It
seems irresponsible to never require an officer engaged in the most serious use of force possible to
write a report about what happened.
Misconduct Investigations Labeled "Administrative Reviews": We continue to object to
PSD's investigation being referred to as an "Administrative Review" (Policy Section 3, Sections 1,
3.1, 3.3, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 7.1.1, 8.5, and 8.6). This, we said, is an example of semantic gymnastics
designed to prohibit a person who survives being is shot by the police from filing a complaint or an
appeal about the officer's behavior or the Bureau's findings (which are almost inevitably that the
officers acted within policy). Lesley Paul Stewart, who was shot in the head by the PPB in 2007 but
lived, tried to file a complaint but was unable to, as was Fred Bryant, the father of Keaton Otis, in
2012. A person who is racially profiled, called a name, hit with a baton, zapped with a Taser or any
other less serious misconduct can file complaints and appeals. This amounts to unequal protection
under the law and must be changed.
Define "Walk Through": The Directive refers repeatedly to a voluntary (for involved
officers) and mandatory (for witness officers) "walk through" but does not define what that means
(Sections 2.1.1.4, 2.1.7.1.1 & 2, and 2.1.8). So far as we know, and according to the Compliance
Officer's reports, no officer has yet undergone the voluntary walk-through of a scene since that
practice was instituted in conjunction with the DOJ Agreement years ago.
Civilian Agency Should Head to Any PPB Deadly Force Incident: Section 4.4 on the
duties of Professional Standards when an officer is involved in a deadly force incident outside City
limits no longer includes the requirement to contact IPR (or it successor civilian review agency), but
it should.
Timely Communication by Chief: The Bureau has still not reinstituted the timeline in
Section 9.5 which required the Chief to hold a briefing the day after an incident rather than on the
"next business day" as it now reads. If a shooting happens on a Friday, the community should not
have to wait until a Monday or Tuesday to find out the basic facts. PCW hopes that with a new
District Attorney in office, the previous DA's objections to the mandatory compelled interview
within 48 hours will dissipate, and the PPB will not feel pressured to withhold information from the
public. The PPB and the City should give out as much information as possible, especially to allay
concerns about how rumors spread after officer involved shootings. Putting out information faster
will stem that tide.
--A side note on this issue: people who have been wounded by the police and brought to the
hospital have been identified in shifting timelines. Chase Peeples was identified while in the
hospital, but six days after he was shot (October/November 2017). Jason Hansen was not identified
until nearly three weeks after he was shot, but while he was in the hospital (October/November
2018). Ryan Beisley was not identified 24 hours after he was shot supposedly for investigative
reasons, but his name was released when he got out of the hospital two days after the incident
(December 2018).
Releasing Information on Officers: We previously expressed our thanks for Section 9.1
language which now restricts the release of a victim's criminal information without it being
requested. But we noted the Bureau rarely talks about the history of officers involved in shootings,
especially when they have been involved in previous misconduct and/or deadly force situations. The
Directive only requires the release of the officer's name and length of service (Sections 9.8 and
9.7.4). Section 9.8 says the officer's names should be released within 24 hours, but still includes an
exception added in 2017 for a "credible threat." We pointed out in previous comments that this
language echoes a poorly considered piece of legislation that was defeated in the 2016 Oregon
legislature and should be removed from the Directive. If the Bureau is committed to transparency,
officer names must be released.
Contacting Oregon and US Departments of Justice: In our previous comments, we called
for a deleted section requiring the Bureau to contact the Department of Justice to be reinserted. We
believe this should include both the US Department of Justice-- the Civil Rights division and
whoever collects data on officer involved shootings-- and the State of Oregon DOJ, which began
collecting and posting narratives about deadly force incidents in late 2016 (after Portland Copwatch
repeatedly called attention to the 2007 statute requiring such information be released).
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DIRECTIVE 1020.00 FIREARMS ADMINISTRATION
Basic Gun Safety Ignored: Directive 1020.00 still seems to ignore gun safety rule #1:
Never point a weapon at anyone unless you're prepared to shoot them. This means Policy Section 2
is disingenuous in stating "safety is paramount and the PPB shall hold its members to the strictest
of standards regarding weapon safety." Section 1.3 says "Members shall not unnecessarily
brandish any firearm," but officers pointed their firearms at people 430 times in 2017 and 196 times
in the first three quarters of 2018. While the number has gone down since then, we still wonder
whether every instance of pointing a firearm involved a substantial risk of injury or death to officers
or community members.
A Lot of Authority in Lower Ranks: Section 2.4.1.1, which used to require the Chief's sign-
off for officers to carry a secondary firearm, now allow the Training Division, which is overseen by
a Captain-- or a Lieutenant acting as Captain, to make decisions about secondary weapons. There
are currently three Assistant Chiefs, a Deputy Chief and a Chief. A Lieutenant is two ranks down
from the Chief's office (Captain and Commander). We suggest a higher level of review, whether
that means the Training Division head becomes a Commander or the Chief's office conducts the
reviews.
No Drunken Shootings: We would still like to see a change to strengthen Section 1.3
which says members should not carry a firearm "if they are impaired by intoxicants to a noticeable
or perceptible degree." No officer should use a weapon with any impairment by intoxicants.
More Unarmed Cops Means More Community Trust: The Directive requires officers to
carry firearms. Supervisors should be allowed to waive the requirement based on the rules of a
psychiatric/medical or faith-based facility, and/or if the officer is attending a community meeting
where the firearm might be seen as threatening. Section 2.1.4 only allows waivers "based on
investigative needs" with the example of the officer being undercover.
Reduce Ability to Confuse Firearms and Tasers: Section 5.1.4 on Tasers should be explicit
that officers must carry the electroshock weapons on the opposite side from a firearm, where it now
says to use their "support-hand" side.
Reporting Requirements: A requirement for officers to document firearm use in appropriate
reports should be included in this policy.
Words of Thanks (1): In 2018, we expressed concern that the PPB was going to strike the
Section (4.3) which requires officers checking out AR-15 assault type rifles to be sure they are
functioning properly, but it is still in the Directive; thank you.
Words of Thanks (2)- with caveat: We also noted that Section 9.1 calls on officers to clean
their weapons after using it in the official course of duty, which would likely disrupt meaningful
criminal and administrative investigations of Deadly Force. The PPB added Section 9.1.1 explicitly
saying officers must surrender such weapons. While we thank the Bureau for this change, the
words "or in the official course of duty" should be removed from Section 9.1 to emphasize this new
rule.
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DIRECTIVE 1021.00 WEAPONS QUALIFICATIONS
Ensuring Cops Carry Legal Firearms: While PCW is generally opposed to officers using
guns at all we believe that if officers bring in their own weapons they should be checked for serial
numbers, be legally registered and be disposed of appropriately. This should be added to Section
1.2.2, which only requires officers to qualify for shooting using those firearms, and Directive 1020
Section 2.4.3 only requires a Certified Instructor to "inspect" such weapons.
Lead Poisoning is Also Deadly: We continue to be concerned how the Bureau minimizes
the dangers of lead poisoning on officers, including female officers who bear children. The
Directive says pregnant officers may forego training "under the advice of their physician" (1.2.7.1)
and that nursing mothers can get assistance with "reducing potential lead exposures (eg
loading/unloading, weapons maintenance and range cleaning)" (1.2.8.2). We previously wrote that
deadly bullets "should not additionally contaminate the atmosphere and cause harm. If non-lead
alternatives exist, perhaps the Bureau should look into them."
Good Change Noted: In our 2018 comments we wondered why Training and Professional
Standards were only required to notify the Chief about changes to Taser training or procedures
rather than the Chief being included in that discussion (Section 2.9). The Bureau has added the
words "and submit for approval" to modify the notification requirement. Thank you.
CONCLUSION
Portland Copwatch is encouraged that the Portland Committee on Community Engaged Policing
has begun discussing Directives at its meetings, albeit mostly at subcommittee meetings requiring
interested community members to attend multiple meetings for meaningful input. However, the
sheer size of these policies (some are over 10 pages long) means that trying to review them all in a
15 day period is very difficult for groups who only meet once a month. PCW was able to update
previous comments because we've been at this since 2014. But we and other community members
should be given more time to do the first review.
On that note, the Bureau should also release any problem areas or legal changes that they are
intending to address in the revisions, so as to narrow the focus to those places that will likely
undergo modification.
In terms of the Bureau's final packets, which do include all public comments and a "redline" version
to show what changes were made, it might be worthwhile discussing the content of the finalized
policies in public meetings as well. Frequently when there are references to comments made but not
acted upon, the answers are unsatisfactory and dismissive; we should be able to engage in a
dialogue to help move the Bureau more toward one that is free from brutality, corruption and
racism.
--dan handelman and other members of |
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Portland Copwatch Portland Copwatch is a grassroots, volunteer organization promoting police accountability through citizen action.
Page posted January 28, 2021
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