Portland Copwatch
(a project of Peace and Justice Works)
PO Box 42456
Portland, OR 97242
(503) 236-3065 (office)


June 27, 2004, based on
matrix created May 11, 2004

This document, an update of our December, 2003 analysis, contains:


In August, 2003, the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) made 89 recommendations regarding police shootings and deaths in custody in Portland. On May 11, Chief Foxworth revised his earlier response, claiming that of the 89 recommendations:
-- 53 are "Done"
-- 12 are "In Review," and
-- 24 are "In Progress."

Portland Copwatch, a local organization promoting police accountability, has done its own analysis, which finds that at best,
-- 17 are "Done"
-- 14 are "In Review"
-- 36 are "In Progress," and
-- 16 are partially implemented, meaning they did not meet PARC's criteria in some way.

Portland Copwatch urges PARC and city officials to scrutinize this information during PARC's upcoming return visit to Portland on June 28.



In late August, 2003, the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) released its report on shootings and deaths in custody by Portland Police 1997-June 2000. That report contained 89 recommendations for change, the majority of which focused on the investigative process.

Chief Kroeker's initial responses showed that he agreed (more or less) with 45 of the recommendations, agreed to review 19 of them, disagreed or didn't address 8 of them, and argued that 17 of them were already being done by the Bureau.

The Community Police Organizational Review Team (CPORT), put together by Kroeker in late July to address issues related to the shooting of Kendra James as a "top-to-bottom" review of police policies, essentially glossed over the report, asking the new Chief Foxworth to implement all of the recommendations.

The Citizen Review Committee (CRC), the nine-member "police review board" created as part of the Independent Police Review Division (IPR) in 2001, was supposed to sort through the recommendations once the report came out and follow the progress of their implementation. Unfortunately, a number of conflicts between the IPR and the CRC (which included the IPR's deliberate shutting out of the CRC from the PARC study as it was being conducted) led to a mass resignation just one week before the report was published. Despite the presence of 5 new members, the CRC has still not directly addressed the PARC report.

In September, Chief Foxworth created a "matrix" of the 89 recommendations which he shared with CPORT and posted on the Bureau's website. That report claimed that 40 of the recommendations are "done," but an analysis by Portland Copwatch showed that as many as 24 of those 40 were not implemented as recommended by PARC or require ongoing review. Copwatch also found two more "In Review" items then the 36 the Bureau claimed, and seven more "in progress" than the Bureau's 10, and 22 which were only partially implemented.

The Bureau also had rejected three items.

PARC will be returning to Portland on the week of June 28 to begin their next review of shootings and deaths in custody, July 2000-December 2001.

--Summary of updated Matrix dated May 11, 2004

On May 11, Chief Foxworth released an updated version of the Matrix. According to this revised document, 5 items which were "In Progress" are now "Done," 8 which were "In Review" are now "Done," and 18 which were "In Review" are now "In Progress." Chief Foxworth has also put back on the table for reconsideration all three "Rejected" items, of which, the Bureau says, two are "In Review" and one is "In Progress." This makes the total 53 "Done," 12 "In Review," 24 "In Progress," and zero rejected.

Portland Copwatch's analysis shows, however, that like many of the original items marked "Done," some of these items involve ongoing review, were not implemented as suggested, or are difficult to verify as they are based on unpublished revised "Directives" or other Bureau documents not available to the public. In short, our analysis finds that at best, 17 are "Done," 14 are "In Review," 36 are "In Progress," and 16 are partially implemented, meaning they did not meet PARC's criteria in some way.

The first specific item of note is that Chief Foxworth does appear to have listened to the community regarding a police helicopter (7.21), so in order to address PARC's concerns is looking at adding another police airplane (which we are not ready to comment on at this time).

Of the three previously rejected items, the Bureau is now reviewing the idea that an officer involved in a police shooting should have his or her commander sit in during disciplinary review of the incident but not being able to vote on the outcome (6.7). The Bureau's original reply was that by voting, the Commander remained accountable, but PARC thinks (and we agree) this is a conflict of interest and does not amount to an unbiased review.

The second item now "In Review" (7.18) is about ending the use of the term "lethal cover" in incidents where "less lethal" is in use because it may lead to the idea that lethal force will be "necessary." The Bureau's original response was that the word "lethal" is used to clarify what kind of cover is being called for. The training division is now considering this recommendation.

The third, which is listed as "In Progress" (6.13), calls for the people who actually conduct the investigations into the shootings/deaths to present the facts to the Review Level Committee. Chief Foxworth claims this will be part of the soon-to-be-established "Use of Force Review Board" (UFB), which is a positive step, but as the draft of the UFB's policies has not been released we are unable to verify this claim.

Portland Copwatch has raised the concern since learning that the Bureau was looking at Phoenix's UFB model that this new system should be integrated with the Independent Police Review Division and its Citizen Review Committee.

Other noteworthy changes by the Bureau, all listed as "In Progress," include:
3.1: Adding language on the value of human life to the Bureau's mission statement (although we fear the loaded term "sanctity of life" noted by Foxworth has too-broad political implications);
3.3: Revising the deadly force policy prohibiting shooting at fleeing suspects except under very particular circumstances; and
3.4: Adding a restriction to "negligently placing oneself in harm's way," which we hope is specific to PARC's recommendation that prohibit such actions which "unnecessarily lead to the use of deadly force."

It is worthwhile to examine all of the recommendations which are listed as either being "in progress" or "in review," since those are likely to be implemented with minor but significant alterations to the intent of the PARC review.

A brief analysis by-the-number is below. For more information contact Portland Copwatch at 503-236- 3065 or copwatch@portlandcopwatch.org.
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6/27/04, based on matrix created 5/11/04

Plus signs (+) indicate recommendations originally rejected by Kroeker (3.5, 6.8, 7.17) and Foxworth (6.7, 6.13, 7.18).

Asterisks (*) mark the allegedly implemented items ("Done") which Portland Copwatch finds did not meet the PARC standard or are in reality "in review" or "in progress."

Ampersands (&) accompany the items which were which were "In Review" are now "In Progress," double ampersands (&&) for those which were "In Review" are now "Done," triple ampersands (&&&) for those "In Progress" are now "Done."

Bureau says 53. (Copwatch says 17 [with reservations], with 8 "in progress", and 28 ongoing or in review, in progress, or not meeting PARC's standards):
3.2*, 4.1&&, 4.2*, 4.3*, 4.4&&&*, 4.5&&*, 4.6*, 4.8*, 4.9*, 4.10*, 4.11&&&*, 4.12*, 4.15*, 4.16&&&, 4.17&&&, 4.18&&, 4.19, 5.1, 5.2*, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6&&, 5.7, 5.8*, 5.9&&&, 5.10*, 5.11, 5.12&&, 5.14*, 6.2&&*, 6.3&&*, 6.6&&*, 6.9, 6.17, 7.1*, 7.2*, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.7*, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10*, 7.11*, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, 7.16*, 7.19*, 7.22*, 7.23*, 7.24, 8.3.

_In review_
Bureau says 12. (Copwatch says 14):
4.7, 4.13, 4.14, 5.4, 6.5, 6.7+, 7.6, 7.18+, 7.21, 8.2, 8.4, 8.5.

_In progress_
Bureau says 24. (Copwatch says 36):
3.1&, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5+&, 3.6, 5.13&, 5.15&, 6.1&, 6.4&, 6.8+&, 6.10&, 6.11&, 6.12&, 6.13+, 6.14&, 6.15&, 6.16&, 6.18&, 6.19&, 6.20&, 7.15&, 7.17+&, 7.20, 8.1.

_Partially implemented_
(Copwatch says 16.)
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3.1: Adding language on the value of human life to the Bureau's mission statement, which is currently being reviewed by the City Attorney. While we welcome such a change, we fear the loaded term "sanctity of life" noted by Foxworth has too-broad political implications.

3.3: Revising the deadly force policy prohibiting shooting at fleeing suspects except when their crime involved injuring others or they are likely to harm others, and only when no other means are available and innocent bystanders will not be endangered. The Bureau says this is being integrated into the revised Directive 1010.10.

3.4: Adding a rule to avoid "negligently placing oneself in harm's way," which we hope also specifically includes PARC's recommendation that prohibit such actions which "unnecessarily lead to the use of deadly force."

3.6: Creating a Use of Force reporting form, which is supposedly being implemented on July 1.

6.1: The Use of Force Review Board will examine deaths in custody as well as shooting incidents.

6.12: Suggests that members of the Review Level Committee (whose work will be done by the Use of Force Review Board in the future) should make decisions based on relevant facts and be encouraged to dissent from the majority. The Bureau says this is how the UFB will function.

6.13: Calls for the people who actually conduct the investigations into the shootings/deaths to present the facts to the Review Level Committee. The Bureau says this will happen at the UFB. (This item was previously rejected.)

6.19 and 6.20: Recommend that any Awards be based on all available information, including information that may not be in the investigative file. The Chief says that awards will be run past the UFB and that Personnel will be changing their process for giving awards. (What this may mean is that in cases in which officers take a life when other options existed, as in the Jose Mejia Poot case, awards will not be given out to the officers.)

7.15: Changing the directive on shooting at moving cars to be more restrictive, with the Bureau even offering to add training to support that change.

8.1: Calling for a study of shootings and deaths in custody to help prevent future incidents; the Bureau says they will use a "Management Information System (MIS)" to look at trends, but added in May that the Training Division will review "each case." If integrated with item 8.2 (which is "In Review"), which implies the UFB will create a database to help track trends, this is a very important change.
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Broken into four categories:
Recommendations that are not "Done" (28)
(B) Questionable "Done" Items (16)
(C) "Done" items which require ongoing work ("In Progress") (8)
(D) No questions (1)

Items on which no change was made since September are marked .

(A) 28 recommendations that are not "Done":

3.2 recommends expanding the deadly force policy to include strikes to the head or other areas of the body with impact weapons; the current policy only says that some kinds of weapons may constitute deadly force "depending on how they are used" (2003 manual p. 408).

4.2 recommends the supervisor on the scene of non-injury accidental discharges and animal shootings should be required to notify the deadly force investigators immediately. The directive on deadly force (1010.10) specifies that in these scenarios the supervisor may call detectives "if the circumstances dictate" (2003 manual p. 412). In the new matrix, the Chief states that the new directive "addresses investigative responsibilities" but does not state that supervisors will be required to notify investigators.

4.3 While PARC recommends that investigators document the reasons that officers refuse to submit to a voluntary interview, the memorandum revising procedures issued by Assistant Chief Ferraris on September 2 (henceforth the "Ferraris memo") does not require such documentation, only that the officer's "response" be recorded, and that the Detective Division Commander approve any refusal in advance. The new matrix adds that the revised Directive 1010.10 will "ensure" interviews are tape recorded--except when they are not (if approved, as above).

4.4 suggested that the Bureau meet with the Portland Police Association (PPA) and other unions to work out procedures for taking voluntary statements from officers involved after they are able to consult with attorneys.
The Bureau's short reply is that "In the last two officer-involved shootings, officer statements were taken within one day." Not only does this avoid the question of whether this was negotiated with the PPA, it doesn't clarify whether these cases were flukes or part of a policy change. The last two shootings were of Jose Padilla and James Jahar Perez; the shooting prior to that occurred on Christmas eve and the interviews were delayed by the holiday.

4.5 recommends that the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) take statements from officers a few hours after an incident, regardless of whether they have voluntarily given a statement to the criminal detectives. The response from the Chief is simply that IA and Training Divisions will be involved in the new Use of Force Review Board process, and repeats the fact from 4.4 that two officer statements have been taken within one day. However, since that question was about taking voluntary statements (presumably from criminal investigators) it is not clear whether IAD investigated those shootings in a timely manner. There is no promise to make this into a policy, thus we cannot consider this "done."

4.6 specifically lists which people should be allowed to speak with officers after an incident, including the officer's immediate supervisor and unit commander; the Ferraris memo excludes those two individuals but includes the deputy city attorney and the deputy district attorney. While this is not necessarily a problem, the larger issue is that this restriction is limited to "when* such a restriction is necessary" as opposed to the blanket restriction recommended by PARC (* the word "when" appears in the matrix, but not the Ferraris memo). The new matrix indicates that restrictions will be written into the revised Directive 1010.10 but does not clarify this point.

4.8 specifically recommends that supervisors on the scene should determine whether officers have spoken to anyone prior to detectives' arrival; the Ferraris memo gives this responsibility to the Investigating Detectives (IDs). This is a serious problem since the supervisors are more likely to be on the scene first and can prevent further discussion before the IDs arrive.

4.9 recommends that officers be sequestered until they have been interviewed on tape by investigators, the Ferraris memo states that the officers may leave the scene if cleared by the Homicide Sergeant in charge, but mentions nothing about previously submitting to an interview. The new matrix adds that the on-scene supervisor will also be involved in allowing officers to go and keeping officers separated, but still doesn't discuss that this remain in effect until an interview occurs.

4.10 specifically suggests Traumatic Incident Committee (TIC) team members need to stay outside of a crime scene; the response is that the Personnel Division will "confirm the roles" of the TIC team, not that they will be excluded. The Chief has stated that the revised Directive will "include restrictions on managing personnel" but is not specific what those restrictions will be.

4.11 says to "memorialize in policies a rule expressly prohibiting members of the Traumatic Incident Committee" or other non-involved parties from entering a scene of a shooting or death. In the May matrix, the Bureau states that "Communication restrictions have been revised," but does not explain where these restrictions are contained (the pervious matrix stated it would be part of Directive 1010.10). It also only refers to TIC members following restrictions, not all uninvolved personnel.

4.12 recommends interviewing civilian witnesses "whenever possible"; the Foxworth matrix says the IDs will "make every effort to tape record civilians," which is not quite the same thing. The Bureau's new matrix states that the revised Directive 1010.10 ensures "member interviews," meaning that police being interviewed will be taped, but repeated that "every attempt will be made" to record citizens.

4.15. Although the Ferraris memo directs that "all interviews of involved members where the material facts are discussed will be tape recorded," it does not specifically prohibit "pre-interviews" (which could be considered conversations as opposed to interviews) as recommended by PARC.

5.2 suggests written guidelines and training for collection of physical evidence; the Bureau mentions the current Directives but does not offer to create a separate manual.

5.8 suggests that all witnesses draw their own sketches and label them;
while the Bureau claims this is part of the Detective Division's protocol, it is not listed in the Directives along with other responsibilities for Detectives investigating shootings.

5.10 suggests that all witnesses including emergency and medical professionals be interviewed on tape; the Foxworth matrix says the investigations rely on written reports by these specific important witnesses.

5.14 is about retaining all documents as part of the official file. The Bureau claims that it is following the City's guidelines to archive records while keeping them in the official file. However, the photos and videos from the cases reviewed last year were found filed in the Identification Division. As with recommendation 5.11, the new matrix points out that the Use of Force Review Board will maintain information for use by the board, but doesn't specify nor whether and how that information will be retained after the UFB is done with it.

(17, 18, 19)
6.2 recommends that after action reports be completed in all cases.
6.3 suggests that unit commanders prepare and sign after action reports. The Bureau earlier argued that Lieutenants and Sergeants should write them, asserting that Commanders review and approve such reports, but the implication is that they are now agreeing with this recommendation.
6.6 further recommends that after action reports contain "meaningful analysis." The Bureau says these items have been "communicated" to commanders and that revising Directives are "in progress"; thus these three recommendations are "In Progress" and not "Done."

7.1 says that officers on the scene of a critical incident should make a plan before responding, if possible, but the reply is that this concept is taught in "post shooting procedures."

7.2 recommends that communication be improved to reduce officer risk; the Bureau response is about defining areas of control and assignment of tasks, but not improvement of communication.

7.7 is about supervisory training for critical incidents; while Foxworth says this is "done" it also says the Bureau "will look at additional training."

7.10 is about keeping an appropriate distance during vehicle pursuits; the Bureau claims this has been done since 1997, but the directive in question (630.05) says nothing about distance.

7.11 is about foot pursuits; while Foxworth says this is "done" it also says the Bureau "will examine model policies."

7.16 is about minimizing accidental discharges; the recommendation specifies field operations and shooting review but Foxworth refers only to training. The Bureau also claims this has been done since 1996, before the PARC study time period began. The Bureau also notes that this requires an on-going training commitment, which means it can't be "done."

7.19 is about reviewing the effectiveness of all "less-lethal" hardware, but the Bureau's response has to do with the 2002 introduction of Tasers. There is nothing about pepper spray, "beanbag" guns, and other "less lethals."
The May response from the Bureau added that the Training Division produced a report on Tasers including a proposed annual review of Taser use, but still doesn't address other weapons.

7.22 proposes that the Bureau "ensure Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) officers consistently exercise their specialist skills"; the response says the CIT officer have received ongoing training since 2000 with a database to track outcomes. This does not address the recommendation.

7.23 suggests that CIT officers be better deployed and that their skills be tapped into more often; the response is that since 1995 when the CIT was created the 911 center dispatches CIT officers to specific incidents. This answer is inadequate and ignores the heart of the recommendation, which is to review current practice for improvement.

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(B) Questionable "Done" items (16):
Some of the Bureau's responses are unclear without seeing specific language being proposed for new Directives, the proposed Use of Force Review Board, or non-public documents such as training manuals.

4.1 suggests adding Internal Affairs or other special investigators to shootings and deaths cases. The matrix states that the Training Division and IAD will be involved in investigations and mentions the Use of Force Review Board, but is not clear how this satisfies PARC's recommendation.

4.16 recommends six specific ways to improve the Deadly Force Interview Checklist; the reply states that it "has been modified" but does not acknowledge the items PARC identified.

4.17 suggests that investigators be required to cover all areas on the Deadly Force Interview Checklist; the Bureau's response only repeats that the list has been modified, nothing is said about requiring it be fully used. (Formerly "In Progress.")

4.18 recommends that a similar checklist be created for in-custody deaths;
the terse reply is: "Detective Division modified the interview checklist." This does not state whether a new checklist was created for these separate incidents. (Formerly "In Progress.")

4.19 recommends that a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) not take place until after an investigative interview takes place; the response refers to the "current practice" of the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing, which takes place after an officer is interviewed but may happen before an investigation is completed. There is no mention of written protocols which formalize this "practice."

5.1 which suggests that non-essential personnel be barred from an officer-involved-shooting or death crime scene is only vaguely covered in the Ferraris memo's "only those persons having a necessary function to perform." PARC was probably looking for a more specific list of who has a "necessary function." The new matrix states that an entry point will be created where a log will be maintained at the entry point, but still does not list who will be allowed in or excluded.

5.3 regarding bringing appropriate equipment on the scene is allegedly "done," yet "The Bureau believes this will have significant fiscal impact." Kroeker wrote about two homicide vans which exist.

5.6 recommends that the Bureau develop checklists of summary forms that require key information to be reported by investigators. The Bureau claims these have been developed and are part of Detective Division protocols, documents not easily accessible to the public.

5.9 recommends that investigations should focus in part on whether officers' policy and tactical decisions lead to the incident in order to decide if means other than deadly force could have been used. The Bureau reply is that there will now be "a broad range of questions per the recommendation" and again points to the inclusion of Training and IAD in the Use of Force Board procedure.

5.11 creates a specific checklist of what should be included in all case files; the Bureau says this has been done since 2002, but how can this be verified (Detective Division protocols)? The new matrix points out that the UFB will maintain information for use by the board, but doesn't specify whether it will be the five items detailed by PARC, nor whether that information will be retained after the UFB is done with it.

5.12 asks for a complete summary of each investigation that highlights any inconsistencies. Chief Foxworth states that "this summary has been adopted and included on recent cases." It does not say whether this is written in protocols, policy, or elsewhere.

6.9 calls for the commanding officer of the Training Division to be a permanent non-voting member of the Review Level Committee for shootings cases; the Bureau earlier said this was done on a "case-by-case basis."
The revised matrix states that the Use of Force Review Board will include a commander from the Training Division and an investigative unit "such as" Internal Affairs. This could mean that Homicide and IAD investigators may both sit on the board, but only the unpublished UFB Directive contains that information.

7.3 recommends that supervisors be involved in high-risk incidents as early as possible; the Bureau says these ideas are contained in the "Defensive Tactics/Patrol Tactics Lesson Plan manual in sections 7 and 8." This is not a public document, so we cannot verify this claim.

7.4 recommends that supervisors be responsible for planning and directing critical responses; the Bureau says these ideas are contained in the "Defensive Tactics/Patrol Tactics Lesson Plan manual in sections 6, 7 and 8." Again, this is not a public document, so we cannot verify this claim.

7.5 says to hold supervisors accountable for their officers' actions at critical incidents; the Bureau claims this has been done at Review Level by command staff since 2000, but how can this be verified?

8.3 recommends retaining records for 25 years; the Bureau's response is to keep them as guided by the City. State Law requires records on sustained Internal Affairs complaints to be kept for 75 years; when Auditor Blackmer asked Chief Kroeker to follow this policy instead of allowing officers to expunge their records after five years, Kroeker refused (July, 2001).

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(C) "Done" items which require ongoing work and are thus "in progress" (8)
Note that all of these items except #6.17 remained unchanged in the new matrix:

5.5 Recommends gathering trajectory information on an ongoing basis, this can't be considered "done" just because it is in protocol, since it apparently was not done for years despite being in the Directives.

6.17 The recommendation is to be sure the Review Level Committee requests information on an ongoing basis; this cannot be considered "done." (Foxworth cites the "current practice" of determining what information is needed.) The new matrix adds that the Use of Force Review Board coordinator will make information available to the UFB.

7.8 is about ongoing review of field performance. The Bureau claims this has been done since 1999, but PARC reviewed cases taking place since that time and made this recommendation anyway. The Bureau also notes that it requires an on-going training commitment.

7.9 is about management of vehicle pursuits. The Bureau claims this has been done since 1997, but PARC reviewed cases taking place since that time and made this recommendation anyway. The Bureau also notes that it requires an on-going training commitment.

7.12, 7.13 and 7.14 are about use of cover, minimizing cross-fire, and minimizing bystander danger. The Bureau claims officers are being trained on these three principles as of 2003 but offers no written proof. It also notes that these all require an on-going training commitment.

7.24 is about continued monitoring of police behavior to minimize in-custody deaths, and the response states that the issue has been identified to the Training Division, but doesn't promise changes.

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(D) No questions:
5.7, which recommends detailed sketches be made and put into the file, is actually in the Ferraris memo.


4.13, regarding the tape recording of witness interviews or allowing them to sign a written report of their interview. Foxworth says this is "In Review," allowing police to "document" witnesses who refuse to be recorded, but does not mention the idea of having them sign a report.

5.4 suggests collecting gunshot residue evidence; the Bureau claims such evidence turns up "false positives" and is not done in the Oregon State Crime Lab any more. Detectives are reviewing this.
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3.5, originally rejected by Kroeker, recommends a policy to define when officer may draw and point firearms and to require reporting when they do so. CPORT recommended the latter (reporting) but the police argued against the former (a written policy limiting the pointing of a firearm). Unfortunately, as of May, Chief Foxworth has agreed to implement the reporting (only when the gun is drawn and pointed) but not the policy.

5.15 calls for an independent civilian oversight model which monitors at least five specific areas, including crime scene processes, evidence collection, witness identification, and investigative file integrity.
Chief Foxworth notes that the Use of Force Review Board will consider policy, training, supervision, tactics and equipment, failing to note that civilians will be at best 3 of 8 members on this board or to specify whether they will cover any of the four items listed above.

6.8 suggests adding a civilian to the Review Level Committee. Kroeker rejected this in favor of the Phoenix-style Use of Force Board; Foxworth's UFB is moving forward, but without an indication that he accepted PARC's idea to have elected officials involved in selecting the board members.

6.10 has to do with presentations of all deadly force and in-custody death cases for the Review Level Committee, which the Bureau is willing to send to the Use of Force Board. However, Foxworth's reply does not repeat the word "all," raising the question of whether some cases might never be reviewed.

6.16 suggests that reviews of shootings and deaths incidents should include a legal review, but the Bureau lists only policy, training, supervision, tactics and equipment.

7.17, suggests reconsidering "weak-handed shooting" due to inaccuracy; the Bureau says this training is for "survival and tactical advantage" but will consider other scenarios. So, although this is technically still rejected, Foxworth claims it is "In Progress" as he is adding training and looking into gun-mounted flashlights. (We are not sure what the connection is to the recommendation.)

We have not written out comments on the following seven "In Review" items:
4.7, 4.14, 6.5, 7.6, 8.2, 8.4 and 8.5 (6.7 and 7.18, previously rejected, as well as 7.21, are discussed in the summary)
or these seven "In Progress" items: 5.13, 6.4, 6.11, 6.14, 6.15, 6.18, 7.20.

Please contact Portland Copwatch at 503-236-3065 with any questions or for further comments.

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To Portland Copwatch's concerns about PARC report

To Bureau's matrix of PARC recommendations

Portland Copwatch Shootings and Deaths in Custody page
Portland Copwatch home page

Page last updated June 27, 2004